(Ordered by topic here.)

Published

  1. Cepollaro, Bianca & Dan López de Sa (forthcoming): ‘Who Reclaims Slurs?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
  2. Dan López de Sa (forthcoming): ‘Disagreements and Disputes about Matters of Taste,” in Jeremy Wyatt, Julia Zakkou & Dan Zeman (eds.), Perspectives on Taste, Routledge (forthcoming)
  3. Horden, John & Dan López de Sa (2021): ‘Groups as Pluralities’, Synthèse 198 (11): 10237-1027, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02715-y
  4. López de Sa, Dan (2017): ‘Making Beautiful Truths’, in JO Young (ed.), Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements, OUP (2017), 38-60
  5. López de Sa, Dan (2015):‘Expressing Disagreement’, Erkenntnis 80 (2015), 153–165, https://doi-org.sire.ub.edu/10.1007/s10670-014-9664-3
  6. López de Sa, Dan (2014): ‘Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many’, Synthèse 191, 1105-17, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0314-0
  7. López de Sa, Dan (2014): ‘What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?’, in Akiba & Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer (2014), 257-271
  8. López de Sa, Dan (2014): ‘Audience in Context’, Erkenntnis 79, 241-53, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9490-z
  9. López de Sa, Dan (2013): ‘The Aposteriory Response-Dependence of the Colors’, Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13, 65-79, https://doi.org/10.5840/croatjphil20131316
  10. López de Sa, Dan (2013): ‘Vagueness as Semantic Indecision, Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Indeterminate Reference’, Metaphysica 14, 197-209, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-013-0121-6
  11. López de Sa, Dan (2013): ‘Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties’, in Hoeltje, Schnieder & Steinberg (eds.), Dependence, Philosophia Verlag (2013)
  12. López de Sa, Dan (2013): ‘What does it Take to Enter the Circumstance?’, Philosophical Studies 159, 147–53, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9695-4
  13. López de Sa, Dan & Elia Zardini (2011): ‘No-no. Paradox and Consistency’ (w/ E Zardini) Analysis 71 (2011), 472-8
  14. López de Sa, Dan (2011): ‘The Many Relativisms: Context, Index, and Beyond’, in Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Blackwell (2011), 102-17
  15. López de Sa, Dan (2010): ‘How to Respond to Borderline Cases’, in Dietz & Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds, OUP (2010), 327-30
  16. López de Sa, Dan (2010): ‘The Makings of Truth: Realism, Response-Dependence, and Relativism’ in Pedersen & Wright (eds.), New Waves in Truth, Ashgate (2010), 191-204
  17. López de Sa, Dan (2010): ‘Relativismos y operadores’ Teorema 29 (2010), 81-93
  18. López de Sa, Dan (2009): ‘Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers’, Mind 118 (2009), 417–25
  19. López de Sa, Dan (2009): ‘Relativizing Utterance-Truth?’ Synthese 170 (2009), 1–5
  20. López de Sa, Dan (2009): ‘Can One Get Bivalence from (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?’, Canadian JP (2009) 39, 273–82
  21. López de Sa, Dan (2008): ‘Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics?’, Noûs 42 (2008), 746–752
  22. López de Sa, Dan (2008): ‘The Over-Generalization Problem’, Synthese 163 (2008), 263–72
  23. López de Sa, Dan (2008): ‘Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem’ Phil.’ Imprint 8/1(2008)
  24. López de Sa, Dan (2008): ‘Presuppositions of Commonality’, in García-Carpintero & Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, OUP (2008), 297–310
  25. López de Sa, Dan (2008): ‘Defending “Restricted” Particularism’ Theoria 62 (2008), 133-43
  26. López de Sa, Dan (2007): ‘Truthmakers, Knowledge, and Paradox’ (w/ Elia Zardini) Analysis 67 (2007), 242–50
  27. López de Sa, Dan (2007): ‘Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization’ PAS 107 (2007), 117–23
  28. López de Sa, Dan (2007): ‘The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Problem?’, Crítica 39 (2007),61-8
  29. López de Sa, Dan (2007): ‘The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement’ IJPS 15 (2007), 339–48
  30. López de Sa, Dan (2007): On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular Terms’ Sorites 19 (2007), 88–91
  31. López de Sa, Dan & Elia Zardini (2016): ‘Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker?’, Analysis 66 (2006), 154–7
  32. López de Sa, Dan (2006): ‘Flexible Property Designators’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (2006), 221–230
  33. López de Sa, Dan (2006): ‘Is ‘Everything’ Precise?’, Dialectica 60 (2006), 397–409
  34. López de Sa, Dan (2006): ‘The Case against Evaluative Realism’, Theoria 21 (2006), 277–94
  35. López de Sa, Dan (2006): ‘Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta’, Theoria 21(2006), 245–5
  36. López de Sa, Dan (2007): ‘Values vs Secondary Qualities’, Teorema 25 (2006), 197–210